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World Trade Organization’s Identity Crisis: Institutional Legitimacy and Growth
Potential in the Developing World
Over and above multilateral system, we need…to promote the social ethics of
globalization…there is no future in globalization that tolerates predatory
behavior and the hoarding of its profits by a minority…There is no future in
globalization that destroys the social and environmental balances…It is up to us
to refuse these drifts and to give globalization a conscience and social ethics, to
give it its full legitimacy and meaning at the service of humankind.1
The free trade paradigm that envelops the new economic order is facing a mid-life crisis.
Trade liberalization is a polarizing concept that has divided scholars, trade experts, jurists,
economists and trade blocs alike into two opposing schools of thought. Both sides proclaim they
possess the holy grail of trade theory to eliminate economic inequality and rid the world of
nefarious paradoxes. Much of the debates have borne themselves out in the last decade as the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) system developed into the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) and an incipient body of jurisprudence began to tackle difficult
analytical, institutional, self-identity and political questions.
The result of institutionalized global trade rules and semi-regular ministerial summits has
been a bifurcated agenda whereby developed countries and well-established trade blocs negotiate
highly self-satisfying trade policies while the developing world scrambles to interject a
development agenda that presently appears incompatible with existing policies. The developing
countries must simultaneously juggle their domestic development, attempt to juxtapose trade
rules that fit their needs, and struggle to reshape the dominant free trade philosophy to yield to its
interests. They do so within an uncompromising system that favors unbridled economic
competition over progressive implementation. Further, the WTO’s judicial branch, comprised of
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the Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body, has explicitly excluded protection for the
developing world’s most potent comparative advantage- labor and cultural uniqueness. As trade
principles continue to buttress the relative influence of developed countries to establish
preferential rules vis-à-vis the developing world, the system risks losing legitimacy among the
beneficiaries of international trade.2
Therefore, this Article will suggest a novel perspective on WTO jurisprudence that
focuses on the existing legal foundation for supporting interests of the developing world, and
illustrates that latent resources exist in the developing world that are worthy of WTO protection
and enforcement. Hence, this Article will argue that the future expansion and even the continued
feasibility of the WTO’s trade liberalization model rest squarely on its willingness to incorporate
and promote the developing world’s agenda in a way that recognizes cultural uniqueness and
production process as intrinsic components of internationally traded goods and services.
I.

Integral Connection Between Developing Countries’ Agenda and GATT
Instruments

This section will analyze several provisions of the principle trade instruments that give rise to
special or differential treatment for developing countries. The foregoing will demonstrate that
the interests of the developing world lie at the heart of the legal structure empowered to interpret
and administer trade rules.
A.

The WTO- Institution and ‘Constitution’
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In the WTO Agreement, the preamble proclaims a platitudinous recognition for the need to
secure for developing countries and least developed countries (“LDC”) a share of the growth of
international trade proportionate to their developmental needs.3 Article 3 of the same agreement
ends with an understanding that the WTO should coordinate its global economic policy-making
with other international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (“IMF”).4
The WTO’s judicial branch is governed by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”),
which empowers the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) to administer the rules and procedures,
and to establish panels and adopt panel and appellate body decisions.5 The DSU prescribes
overarching policy guidelines to direct its decision making; including providing security and
predictability, preserving the rights and obligations of Members, and significantly, to clarify
existing rules and agreements in conformity with customary rules of interpretation and public
international law.6 Additionally, when a Dispute Settlement Panel adjudicates a particular
dispute, it has the right to seek information and technical advice from either the parties or any
appropriate third party; presumably, this includes information regarding local custom or varying
perspectives on legal entitlement to trade benefits.7
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The 1947 GATT is the constitution that provides the institutional framework in which the
DSB and the WTO operate.8 The GATT establishes the notion that trade should be aimed at
raising living standards, ensuring full employment, and developing the full use of world
resources through expanding production and exchange of goods.9 In order to have meaning, this
expression of general purpose must underlie the Panel and Appellate Body’s jurisprudence and
must influence doctrinal development.
In Article 3, the so-called National Treatment clause, the GATT draws a bright-line around
“like products,” and accords them equal treatment once they have entered a host country’s
domestic market.10 This Article has been the subject of innumerable litigations surrounding
cultural and societal definitions of “like” and “directly substitutable or competitive” products,
and whether the definitions are susceptible to a market criteria analysis or a generalized intrinsic
properties analysis.11 Article 3’s protectionism proviso is also important because it recognizes
that protectionism is sometimes a legitimate interest and it incorporates the GATT’s Trade and
Development section by reference.12
Many consider Article 4, termed the “cinema exception,” a unique cultural exception that
permits import quotas for foreign films.13 This quota exception for cinematographic films
reflects an underlying value in cultural sensitivity and serves as a “hook” for developing
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countries who must defend seemingly protectionist trade measures.14 At a minimum, Article 4
affirms the right of developing countries to shield their national culture from foreign penetration
to the extent films act as cultural conduits.
In Article 9, the GATT addresses marks of origin, which Members often require to denote
country of origin on imported products.15 This article purports to limit a Member’s ‘marking’
requirements to a standard that does not overly burden the product’s exporter.16 Beyond the
textual requirements, Article 9 implicitly recognizes a Member’s interest in identifying a
product’s country of origin. Whether such information is relevant for tariff or duty purposes, or
because such information is an intrinsic component of the product itself, the ‘mark’ makes goods
unique to its country of origin.17
Article 18 justifies a Member’s protectionist behavior if done for the purpose of
implementing an economic development policy aimed at raising the standard of living.18
Examples of permissible protections include tariff barriers and narrowly targeted quantitative
restrictions.19 Only developing countries and those with low standards of living are permitted to
temporarily deviate from other GATT obligations.20 Notably, the remaining Article 18
provisions treat developing countries and LDC’s differently on account of their disparate level of
development and prescribe permissible deviations from other GATT principles.21 Article 18 thus
embodies the principle that developing countries merit special protections and greater flexibility
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in trade liberalization. The developing world’s margin of appreciation to define the terms of its
own industrial development underlies this principle of special treatment.22
Article 20 of the GATT contains the so-called social-clauses because it carves out exceptions
for, inter alia: protection of public morals, compliance with other laws or regulations not
inconsistent with the GATT, prohibition of prison labor, protection of national treasures with
historic or archeological value and protection of natural exhaustible resources.23 Naturally,
litigation has focused on whether to construe these exceptions broadly or narrowly so as to afford
a modicum of domestic control over trade that affects the foregoing. In the context of
developing countries that seek to defend allegedly protectionist trade measures, Article 20 is
designed to shift the burden to the party seeking to limit trade.24 This creates a presumption that
international trade measured in dollars trumps a country’s right to protect its collective values.25
Nevertheless, Article 20 provides a broad legal foundation from which developing countries can
assert their right to define, develop and protect collective values and culture.26
Article 36 and 37 establish a trade and development agenda within the WTO that should also
influence the jurisprudence of the DSB.27 Article 36 lays out principles and objectives,
including: improving the standard of living, progressively developing economies, recognizing
that export interests are vital to LDC’s and developing countries, export earnings are vital to
22
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economic development, and acknowledging the gap in standard of living between LDC’s and
other countries.28 Article 36 reaffirms the principle that the GATT affords developing countries
and LDC’s special and differential treatment.29 This article reflects the underlying principle that
developing countries shall be accorded protection and treated fairly on account of their unique
economic and developmental circumstances. It would not be logically inconsistent to suggest
according Article 20 or even Article 3 protection to developing countries on account of the
uniqueness of their cultural and other self-identified values. Article 37 goes on to require that
developed countries treat the interests of developing countries and LDC’s with equity and
priority.30 This includes, inter alia, reducing trade barriers, eliminating tariff barriers or import
duties on LDC-produced goods and maintaining equitable trade margins on governmentdetermined prices.31
B. Focused Trade Agreements- Special and Differential Treatment Clauses
Many of the specific trade agreements contain provisions that confer special status and rights
to developing countries. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”), which purports to establish a multilateral framework for protecting
intellectual property, aims to promote technological innovation and the dissemination thereof in
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare.32 In order to facilitate its goals, TRIPS
seeks to balance the rights and obligations of producers and users of intellectual property.33
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Article 8 confers on Members the right to adopt measures to protect public health and nutrition,
and to promote the public interest in sectors that are important to technological and socioeconomic development.34 Implicit in this provision is the right of Members to self-identify
within a recognized margin of appreciation what constitutes public interest and whether
measures are designed to promote it.
Section three of TRIPS provides for the protection of geographical indicators that “identify a
good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory.”35
Article 22 recognizes that geographical indicators are important to symbolize quality, reputation
and other characteristics of a good that are intrinsic to its value.36 Article 23 provides additional
protection for the geographic indicators of wines and spirits.37 In toto, Section three expresses
the underlying assumption that the place of origin is an intrinsic characteristic of goods.
In theory, Part six of TRIPS, which covers transitional arrangements, treats developing
and LDC’s differently and permits them to progressively implement intellectual property
protections.38 The text of Article 65 authorizes developing countries to transitionally implement
intellectual property regimes within five years of the date of application.39 Further, Article 66
allows LDC’s ten years from the date of application to implement an intellectual property
regime.40 Developed countries are encouraged to provide domestic incentives to promote
technology transfer to LDC’s.41 At its core, Part six recognizes the special circumstances of
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developing countries and LDC’s and permits them to slowly transition towards recognizing and
protecting intellectual property- a notably western convention.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS
Agreement”) contains special technical assistance and differential treatment provisions for
developing countries and LDC’s with respect to adopting measures to protect human, animal or
plant life.42 Article 9 promotes technical assistance especially to developing countries through
either bilateral agreements or through appropriate international organizations.43 The goal of such
technical assistance is to permit developing countries to maintain and expand market access for
products implicated by the SPS Agreement.44 Further, Article 10 is the special and differential
treatment clause, which recognizes the special needs of developing countries and permits them to
phase-in sanitary and phytosanitary measures.45 Critically, section 3 allows for specified, timelimited exceptions from SPS obligations in order for developing countries to meet their
developmental needs first.46
In the case of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMS
Agreement”), developing countries are permitted to freely deviate temporarily from obligations
to reduce inappropriate investment restrictions.47 Article 5 extends the transition period for
compliance with the TRIMS Agreement from two years for developed countries, to five years for
developing countries, and seven years for LDC’s.48 Special and differential treatment in the case
of investment measures is especially important for developing countries because domestic
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control over the use of locally produced products, employment of domestic labor, and other
investment restrictions are critical to their trade and social development.
The Agreement on Agriculture, which commits Members to liberalizing their agriculture
industry, is of great interest to the developing world because enormous agricultural subsidies in
developed countries are strangling market access for the developing world. Hence, the
Agricultural Agreement commits developed countries to improving market access for
agricultural products from developing countries and fully liberalizing trade in tropical
agricultural products.49 Further, Article 6 purports to exempt developing countries from
requirements that they reduce agricultural input subsidies in order to encourage agricultural and
rural development.50 Like other special and differential treatment provisions in aforementioned
agreements, Articles 15 and 16 recognize relative economic imbalances and permits developing
countries flexibility and leverage in meeting agricultural liberalizations obligations.51 In its
totality, the Agricultural Agreement seeks to equalize the trade status of developing countries by
promoting greater market access for their agricultural products and exempting their subsidies in
this sector.
The Safeguards Agreement also contains critical exceptions for developing countries
designed to promote their socio-economic and developmental status. Although the Safeguards
Agreement regulates maintenance of temporary industry-wide safeguards, Article 9 provides that
no such safeguard shall be applied against a product originating in a developing country.52
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Additionally, a developing country may extend application of a safeguard for up to two years
beyond the eight-year maximum.53
Lastly, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) commits to increasing
participation of developing countries in the services trades.54 Article 4 provides that to
accomplish such expansion, Members shall negotiate commitments to: strengthen their domestic
services capacity, increase efficiency and competitiveness through access to technology; improve
access to distribution channels and information networks, and liberalize market access in sectors
of interest to developing countries.55 This provision is critical to the developing world’s trade
agenda because it purports to cater to their special needs and interests. This provision implicitly
authorizes developing countries to develop their services trade through their own institutions and
capacity building with assistance from the developed world. Article 4 obligates developed
countries to provide specific forms of assistance and it gives LDC’s heightened priority.56
The foregoing recognizes the special rights and needs of developing countries and
supports a broad interpretation of clauses that afford special and differential treatment. Dispute
Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body should heed the ubiquity of such language in the many
trade instruments and accord greater deference to and protection for measures that developing
countries maintain.
II.

Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body Decisions- Indifferent to Culture
and Developing Status

Within the jurisprudence of the Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body, examples of
cultural indifference, economic presumptuousness, moral vacuity, and analytical isolation
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abound. This Article will discuss some of the premier illustrations and will introduce the DSB’s
“like products” analysis.
“Like products” issues primarily arise under GATT Article 3’s National Treatment provision.
Members must accord similar treatment to “like products” once they enter a domestic market.57
Where products are not “like,” but are “directly competitive or substitutable,” importing
countries may not discriminate between them upon entry into the domestic market.58 The
analysis for competitive or substitutable products is broader and necessitates investigation into
whether protectionist motives exist.59 For the purposes of this Article’s discussion, there are two
predominant “like product” analyses, one more culturally competent than the other.
In 1970, The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments established a factors test for
determining likeness, which takes into account: “the product’s end-uses in a given market,
consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; [and] the product’s
properties, nature and quality.”60 This test is considered the high-water mark for the range of
considerations because it involves both objective factors, relating to the product’s physical
properties, and subjective factors, like its end-use and varying consumer tastes.
The alternate approach to “like products” is narrower and entirely objective because it
considers the product’s physical properties and its tariff classification alone.61 In the sequel to
the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, the Panel examined Japan’s customs duties, taxes and labeling
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practices for imported wines and alcoholic beverages.62 Japan maintained highly specified
definitions for alcoholic beverages, in particular for a traditional Japanese spirit called shochu, to
protect its culturally unique products. Without belaboring the text of the panel’s decision, suffice
it is to say that the panel downplayed the importance and relevance of consumer tastes- which it
considered solely a function of economics, relating to price, availability and its competitive
relationships with other products- and focused on objective economic factors.63 When the newly
formed Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body revisited the case in its delinquency phase
in 1995, they applied a “marketplace” test that considered the elasticity of substitution.64 This
increasingly narrow methodology has dispensed with consumer tastes and end-uses as
meaningful definitions.65
The Panel and Appellate Body faced another trade dispute that involved sensitive cultural
issues in Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals. 66 This case involved a dispute
over a Canadian excise tax that regulated the content of advertising in imported magazines. The
United States perceived the tax as a direct attack on an American magazine, Sports Illustrated,
which recently began running editorialized split-run editions in Canada.67 The Panel considered
the “likeness” of the editorial content in the Sports Illustrated magazines compared to that
contained in a Canadian magazine, Harrowsmith Country Life.68 Although Canada argued that
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the cultural content of a magazine should be considered its prime characteristic, the Panel
analyzed the magazines’ end uses and similar physical properties, natures and qualities.69 Based
on this limited inquiry, the Panel concluded that the products were “like” and that the Canadian
excise tax violated GATT’s Article 3.70
On appeal, the Appellate Body avoided the “like products” issue by concluding that the Panel
Report lacked adequate analysis and let stand the Panel’s legal conclusions.71 The language in
the Appellate Body’s analysis resembled that in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages and
“demonstrated indifference to the fact that the case dealt with a unique product- a cultural goodand that the GATT and WTO function not only within markets, but also in a broader political,
social, and cultural environment.”72 Despite that the Canadian magazine maintains an interest in
identifying and publishing its own culture- specific content, the Appellate Body eschewed its
value and concluded that the U.S. magazine’s content was a substitute for “Canadian” content.73
The trend in the Panel and Appellate Body’s “like products” analysis towards physical
characteristics and marketplace behavior overlooks cultural distinctions and the right and ability
of countries to autonomously identify their cultural trademarks. Such a narrow focus ignores
qualitative and subjective features of a product and leads to an inference that a country’s
differential treatment of certain imports is inherently protectionist. Moreover, the “marketplace”
test demeans and undervalues consumers’ tastes and habits by describing their behavior as purely
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economic. The Appellate Body has forsaken analysis of difficult legal, philosophical, and
cultural questions that inhere in products’ end-uses and consumer tastes.
In Indian Pharmaceuticals, the Panel and Appellate Body displayed contempt and
impatience for India’s developing legal system that had not yet integrated intellectual property
protections. Under the TRIPS agreement, the United States complained that the Indian patent
system lacked adequate intellectual property protections for pharmaceutical products. Despite
India’s qualification for an extended transition towards implementing such protections, TRIPS
required India to maintain a “mailbox” repository for patent applications while it developed its
patent laws.74 To comply with the mailbox requirement, India’s legislature created an
administrative system to register and collect patent applications; however, the Panel concluded
that India’s administrative process failed to preserve the “novelty and priority” of the patent
applications.75
On appeal, India challenged that its administrative system was a sufficient “means” for
accepting applications and that it had created an adequate “mechanism” for creating and
protecting exclusive marketing rights.76 The Appellate Body chastised the Panel for its
interpretive breadth, which considered whether India’s administrative patent system had satisfied
U.S. legitimate expectations, and analyzed the authoritative weight of India’s municipal laws.77
The Appellate Body compared India’s “administrative instructions” regarding patent applications
to the U.S. Patent Act.78 After interpreting domestic law, the Appellate Body concluded that
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India’s administrative patent system failed to preserve the novelty and priority of patent
applications made during the transition period.79 India retorted that the Panel had misinterpreted
the authority of municipal law within India’s legal system.80
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of India’s municipal law displayed legal naiveté and
cultural insensitivity because it failed to consider India’s own description of the weight of
administrative instructions within its legal system. The Appellate Body should have deferred to
India’s definition and interpretation of its legal structure because it is they who have developed
it. The adequacy and sufficiency of India’s administrative patent system are shaped within
India’s legal culture and depend on the legal significance Indian law accords, and thus, the
Appellate Body ought to resist second-guessing. Further, the Appellate Body displayed obtuse
insensitivity to India’s developing status by comparing the authority of its municipal law to the
U.S. Patent Act, which was promulgated within a well-developed formal legal system. By such
decisional conduct, the Appellate Body eviscerated the meaning of TRIP’s transitional exception
for developing countries by requiring a high level of interim patent protection. Further, it
stripped India of its margin of appreciation in adhering to TRIPS.81
III.

Trade and Cultural Uniqueness - Values to Unlock Developing World’s
Potential

Although the Panel and Appellate Body have engrafted onto GATT’s Article 3 “like
products” jurisprudence an indifference to many factors that contribute to a product’s end-use,
goods produced in developing countries and LDC’s uniquely reflect sensitive and vulnerable
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local culture and social values.82 Widget A and Widget B may appear physically identical
despite production in a developed country and a developing country respectively; however,
tangible social values and unique production processes inhere therein to distinguish between
them in critical ways.83
Thus, Panels and the Appellate Body should analyze otherwise “like” products in light of the
labor conditions under which they were manufactured, an importing country’s collective
preferences, inherent characteristics of quality and craftsmanship, unique local or indigenous
production methods, local or indigenous novelty of the good itself, and other socio-cultural
characteristics. Therefore, Panels and the Appellate Body should not presume protectionist
intent when countries maintain trade restrictions to reflect these values, but should rather defer to
the country’s proffer of a legitimate collective preference.
The relationship between societal values and international trade is not new; however,
recognizing that culture and values are intrinsic to traded goods is the key to unlocking latent
potential in the developing world.84 This Article suggests that international trade law must
recognize that culture and values underlie the collective preferences of countries seeking to
maintain trade restrictions and must recognize that culture and values associated with goods
produced in the developing world distinguish otherwise “like products.” This Article will
demonstrate that “like products” jurisprudence lags behind the reality that societal values and
culture matter to end-users.
82
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Professor Nichols identifies why, theoretically, culture matters to international trade. First,
cultural identity “provides patterns of values and standards in shaping motivational orientations
and attributes, and consequently in personality formation.”85 This same argument applies to
goods themselves because products and the country of origin have unique characteristics akin to
personalities. Second, cultural identity “guides and directs the behavior of individuals and
societies,” thus creating collective preferences for trade.86 Finally, cultural identity “helps
individuals organize the world” by creating common codes to facilitate affiliation with the
environment, groups and oneself.87 This same principle applies to goods themselves because
human seek invariably to categorize and classify goods by their characteristics, one of which
includes cultural identifiers.
A recent spate of commercial anti-Americanism illustrates why culture and societal values
that imbue traded goods matters to importing societies. Iconic American companies such as
Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Marlboro and General Motors reported slumping sales in “old Europe”
where it is well known that popular support for American foreign policy is dismal.88 European
consumers appear to be manifesting their virulent disapproval of U.S. foreign policy by avoiding
American brand-labeled products, which in isolation are generally indistinguishable from “like”
non-American products. Hence, European tastes discriminate against products identified as
“American” on the basis of societal and political values unrelated to the product.
Consumers identify products by the national brand that makes them. For example, sale of
the Scottish Glenmorangie whisky company to French owners has stirred interest in recent weeks
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because the Scottish company, like many, has a strong national identity that faces erasure.89
Corporate nationality is important because it characterizes a company’s business style and
influences corporate behavior.90 “Decision-making is influenced by the culture in which the
executives were educated, work and live.”91 Thus, it is important for companies to associate
their product’s identity with the owner’s national culture because local commerce breeds
successful business leaders, autonomy and pride.92 Therefore, trade policies that discriminate
between “like products” is sometimes justified because Scotch-owned Glenmorangie whisky is
inherently distinct from French-owned Glenmorangie whisky. This argument should not be
construed to justify protection of waning domestic industries. When maintained by developing
countries to protect products’ cultural identity, however, Panels and the Appellate Body should
defer, which is consistent with the object and purpose of GATT’s Article 20 exceptions and the
controlling instrument’s special or differential treatment clause.
In the context of collective preferences, the European Union (“E.U.”) has lead in molding
trade policy around its cultural values and public policy concerns. For example, the E.U. rejects
the 1999 WTO Beef Hormones decision, which declared its ban in hormone-treated beef GATT
illegal, and it sets animal-welfare standards for chickens, pigs and cows.93 The E.U. Article on
collective preferences in international trade suggests creation of a special safeguards clause in
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trade law that would enable a Member to restrict imports based on collective preference.94 For
developing countries, this proposition already finds legal support in GATT’s Article 20 and
among the numerous special and differential treatment clauses.95 Additionally, this proposal
would permit countries to display proclivities towards “like” products produced in developing
countries, a device this Article suggests would unlock unknowable trade potential in the
developing world.
Contrary to the gripes of free trade enthusiasts, developed countries’ demand for products
with cultural value, such as those produced in the developing world by unique processes, are not
necessarily protectionist. Professor Nichols suggests that a ban on a product is just as likely to
have protectionist motives as a ban on a process, and thus distinguishing between product and
process is disingenuous.96 Additionally, “the value-laden reasons for tolerating bans on products
are just as compelling for tolerating the ban on goods made in certain ways.”97 For example,
many developed countries maintain restrictions in their Generalized Trade Schedules for goods
produced by forced or child labor.98 The WTO sanctions such trade restrictions in its founding
Charter and in the GATT.99
In many markets already, consumers identify and select products from developing
countries on the basis that the products are made by unique processes or because of cultural
distinctions embedded in the products. For instance, the expansion of “Fair Trade” brands
demonstrates the potential for culturally-branded and process-oriented goods. Although Fair
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Trade represents a small share of the market in the coffee trade, its steady growth is evidence of
a growing collective preference.100 Fair Trade brands and organic products offer an opportunity
for quality and process-oriented consumers to connect with the developing world. These goods
should be accorded special trade protection and developing countries should be entitled to
protect such enterprises.
Importantly, developing countries are accorded differential trade treatment on the basis of
their economic development. In the context of improving and expanding the market for
developing countries’ exports, developed countries should be permitted to maintain preferential
trade status for commodities and cultural products on the basis that these products are not “like”
under Article 3 of the GATT.101 This section argues that such products are unique because of
cultural and value-laden process characteristics in the country of origin, and because developing
world production is a value-added alternative. Under the Border Tax Adjustments’ likeness
definition, consumer tastes and collective preference for goods produced in the developing world
would be enough to justify a preferential trade measure.
IV.

Untapped Growth and Trade Potential- Informal Economic Sector

In addition to the connection between cultural values and trade, the international trade regime
fails to take account of alternative economic forms that are prevalent in the developing world.
The informal economies in South and Central America alone represent an enormous un-tapped
100
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resource that WTO jurisprudence and international trade does not recognize. Currently,
developing countries’ economies are growing at six percent per annum (6%), which is the fastest
pace in thirty years.102 Unless structural reforms take place to legitimize the laborers and
vendors comprising regional trade within these economic hotbeds, external shocks or financial
bubbles could severely disrupt these economies once again.103 Further, the workers and
employers within the informal sector lose out on international trade’s benefits because traditional
law and international trade do not recognize them. Thus, extralegal commercial transactions take
place outside traditional markets to the tune of $74 billion in Peru alone.104 Capitalizing and
legitimizing the informal, extralegal sectors of the developing world represent an enormous pool
of latent resources that can fuel equitable and efficient trade growth into the future.
To grasp the entire context of the legitimacy crisis, roughly 534 million people can be
classified as working poor in developing countries.105 In 1997, the working poor constituted
roughly twenty-five percent (25%) of the employed labor force in the developing countries, and
approximately ninety-five percent (95%) of the working poor live in low income countries.106
Further, support for privatization, such as that supported by the WTO, has slipped from 46% to
36% of the population in Latin America.107 In 1993, Mexico City had roughly 150,000
unlicensed street-vendor stands with another 293,000 in other Mexican Centers.108 In the
Philippines, around 57% of city residents and 67% of rural people live in extralegal dwellings for
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which there is no legal title and of which the State has no record.109 In total, Mr. De Soto’s study
concluded that about 85% of urban land in the developing and former communist world, and
between 40% and 53% of rural land, is held in informal and extralegal arrangements not
recognized or protected by the State.110 The value this real estate is estimated to be at least $9.3
trillion.111
These statistics are not intended to comprehensively survey the demographics or economies
of developing countries, but rather beg the question. Has globalization, bent on free trade
principles, positively distributed wealth in a way that maximizes resource efficiency in the
developing world? This is not the first Article to suggest it has not, howeverby arguing that the
WTO ought to re-shape its identity, this Article poses a sobering perspective.
The unattractive consequence of extralegal property arrangements and informal labor is that
without government-enforceable legal protection, they cannot derive capital benefits such as
eligibility for international trade.112 Complex property systems in developed countries provide
meaningful protection for capital-intensive projects that are the engines for international trade.
The lack thereof in developing countries acts as a disincentive for such forms of international
trade as intellectual property. Indian Pharmaceuticals is a highly pertinent example that
contrasts the remarkably different stages of property development between developing countries
and developed ones.
In developing countries where informal economies prevail, information is highly imperfect
and dispersed, social and professional networks rarely connect, value is a highly subjective and
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localized feature of a product, and otherwise fungible assets rarely exchange for value. That is,
transactions do not take place within a regulated framework and resources are underutilized
because of discrepancies in information and a lack of exchangeability. What this means for
international trade is what economists call dead capital or, in other words, inefficient resource
utilization.
Service industries that underwrite a broad array of legally recognized contractual
relationships in developed countries might not have those within the informal economies on their
radar. Informal and extralegal employment and property arrangements do not lend themselves
easily to capitalization because bureaucracies in developing countries are ill-equipped to handle
them. For instance, in Peru, it takes almost seven years to obtain legal authorization to build a
house on state-owned land and 207 administrative steps, and 728 steps to obtain legal title for the
land.113 With such obfuscation, it is not be surprising that few international financiers are willing
to endure such delay. Further, opaque administrative processes in developing countries make
technology transfer, a feature of TRIPS, less attractive for developed countries.114
To guard against financiers who exploit endemic imbalances in informal economies,
developing countries must be broadly authorized to maintain investment measures that protect
their resources. Gaps in information and discrepancies in value for fungible assets are pervasive
in developing countries and investors often seek to take advantage of un-regulated or lightly
regulated sectors. To counteract this force, developing countries must be entitled to the
protection of investment measures for longer durations than in the developed world, pursuant to
TRIMS, Article 5.
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Moreover, the laborers in these informal economies work without legal protection, such as
work condition regulations, working hour limits, unionization, minimum wage rates, etc. It is
estimated that informal economic sectors employ between 50% and 75% of all working people in
the developing world, and these people produce between 20% and 66% of economic output from
the Third World.115 The sheer enormity of the extralegal workforce in developing countries,
whose residential and consumer existence is also likely to be extralegal, thwarts attempts by
developed countries to impose formal developmental reforms.116 For example, imposition of a
mailbox system for patent applications, such as that introduced in TRIPS and which was the
basis of the Indian Pharmaceuticals case, is hardly legitimate or effective in a country where the
majority of inhabitants live, work and purchase within an extralegal environment.
Developing countries must be given wider latitude to adapt domestic law to meet the social
and economic needs of its own population before it can cater to zealous traders from developed
countries. International trade jurisprudence should judge the sufficiency of such laws not against
the standards of the developed world, but rather against the internally defined needs of the
developing country. Capitalizing the informal and extralegal economies of the developing world
should be hailed when it satisfies the developmental needs of the populations of developing
countries, and not the needs of the investors. Mr. De Soto argues that “Law is the instrument
that fixes and realizes capital,” and this Article suggests that special entitlements and protections
for developing countries in international trade law must be applied to this end.117

115

De Soto, supra note 104 at 85.
For a study on the effects of trade liberalization on labor markets, see Michael Landesmann, Robert
Stehrer & Sandra Leitner, Trade Liberalization and Labour Markets: Perspective from OECD Economies,
ILO Employment Articles 2002/41 (2002).
117
De Soto, supra note 104 at 157. William R. Cline has written extensively on the topic of trade and
development with an economic perspective. See generally William Cline, Trade Policy and Global
Poverty, Jun. 2004; see also Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent, Jun. 2002.
116

25

V.

Proposed Reform- The Power of Discourse

The foregoing illustrates that the WTO, through its jurisprudence and the dominance of
developed countries, reflects a narrow understanding of international trade’s implications for
developing countries. Through its indifference to cultural distinctions and its rigid prescriptions
for economic and legal formality, the WTO is jeopardizing its legitimacy among the developing
countries’ populations. This Article suggests that to reverse this destructive course, developed
countries and dominant trade blocs should transform their trade discourse and re-phrase their
development agenda.
The E.U., under Pascal Lamy’s leadership, has popularized a “development discourse” by
integrating “rhetorical action” that favors expansion and promotion of equitable trade with
developing countries.118 By changing its trade and development discourse from rhetoric that
favors economic self-interest to to its broader role in international trade, the E.U. shapes the way
its members perceive trade policy as an instrument to equalize and stabilize the international
trading system.119 Further, trade policy has considerable political undertones and so adopting a
pro-development discourse for trade expresses a certain moral and political message to the
developing countries. The E.U.’s success in gaining the multilateral support of developing
countries has earned them a competitive trade and negotiating advantage over competitors, such
as the U.S.
The E.U. has successfully gained trust from developing countries and it has become the
largest market for developing countries’ exports while conversely contributing the largest
118
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amount in foreign direct investment and development aid.120 Although this cycle has made
developing countries somewhat dependent on the E.U. markets, it has fostered a symbiotic trade
relationship characterized by leniency and understanding. The E.U. structures its trade policy as
a pyramid by providing differential access to its markets based on historic and developmental
characteristics.121 In contrast to the U.S. iron-fisted approach to India regarding its
Pharmaceuticals industry, the E.U. essentially excused South Africa’s refusal to abide by TRIPS
so that it could obtain drugs needed to combat AIDS.122 South Africa returned the favor by
bringing other African countries to the bargaining table in Doha.123
Reciprocity in multilateral trade agreements is another key component that demonstrates a
willingness to back discourse with action. For example, the E.U. has liberalized its agricultural
markets consistent with the Agricultural Agreement by importing 35 billion Euros worth of
products from developing countries.124 Canada, similarly, recognizes that developing countries
and LDC’s have low per capita incomes, low levels of human resource development and highly
vulnerable economies and thus offers many of them duty free and quota free access for eligible
products.125
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China and France have proclaimed their support for fair and equitable international trade by
signing a declaration to support “balanced international trade and globalization based on mutual
benefit.”126 Although both countries have tarnished human rights records, they have extended an
olive branch by publicly supporting fair trade that seeks to help developing countries. Their
promises may not be binding, but they express a set of moral and political values that offsets the
countervailing free trade rhetoric. Over time these public expressions of equity, development,
mutuality and fairness, among others, help to spawn dialogue, promote popular legitimacy, and
ultimately catalyze political change.
Discourse is also a way of empowering developing countries in bilateral and multilateral
trade negotiations. One the one hand, rhetoric in trade instruments, at trade summits and in
public statements has already emphasized the connection between trade and intellectual property,
investment, subsidies and the like. Trade agreements sometimes even sound like mouthpieces
for private interests. Corporate-dominated trade notwithstanding, reshaping the discourse of
international trade to reflect the needs of developing countries, on the other hand, can embolden
their status and ensure their opportunity to influence trade policy.
VI.

Conclusion

For too long the WTO has artificially insulated trade discourse and jurisprudence from their
natural connection with society, the environment, labor and other such public interests. The free
trade institution must recognize that it owes its legitimacy and continued feasibility to its
perception in the developing world, and not to post-industrial developed countries. Trade policymakers should seek to integrate equity, balance, cultural understanding, pluralism and modesty
principles into trade agreements and not attempt to eschew them as externalities. Lastly,
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developed countries ought to recognize the value-added potential in implementing a trade agenda
that promotes developing countries’ interests.
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